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Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory and
Evidence
Summary
This paper analyzes the political economy of regulatory and judicial appointment rules. I
study a model of price-setting by a political principal faced with a firm with unknown costs,
and endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency rises with the
effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set-up captures
the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward
election rather than appointment of regulators are more likely the less efficient is the
information-gathering technology, the less stringent are the investment concerns of society,
the stronger are regulators’ revolving-door motivations, and the closer is political
competition. These predictions are consistent with US electric power market data.
Moreover, in accordance with the model, electricity rates are lower and respond less to
shock in input costs in states that elect their regulators or their High Court judges.
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1. Introduction
Understanding which institutional settings are more efficient in inducing public
officials to act in the public interest is a key issue in political economy. A crucial
institution is the procedure of selecting representatives and, in particular, whether
to elect or appoint regulators and judges. While the features linked to these two
constitutional designs have been considered as independent and analyzed, one at a
time, in order to clarify the differences between appointment regimes, there are
several markets where regulation is undertaken by the two types of public
officials at the same time, and a plurality of selection methods survive.
The US electric power market (along with other US markets) is a case in point.
Prices are set by an independent staff at the end of public hearings presided by
regulators and judges, who can either be appointed or elected. Such a framework
is not unique to the US and, in the aftermath of the recent European and SouthAmerican privatizations, a rising need for higher transparency of the regulatory
process has exported beyond American boundaries a similar combination of
independent staffs and accountable top-level regulators and judges (see Newbery,
2000).1 This rich institutional design raises three key questions.
First, what are the forces driving the adoption of a particular appointment rule?
Second, how do the incentives, imposed by selection rules on regulators and
judges, interact with each other and with task-specific motivations? Third, what is
the overall impact of judicial and regulatory appointment rules on the efficiency
of regulatory policies?

1

A similar relation (see OECD, 2002) exists between the Monopolies and Merger Commission

(Monetary Policy Board) and the Director of Fair Trading (Governor of the Bank of England).
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This paper lays out a framework for thinking about these issues and explores their
empirical implications by using US electricity market data. The model bridges the
canonical principal-agent theory of regulation (Laffont, 2000) to a recent body of
political economics literature contrasting elected and appointed officials from a
normative as well as a positive perspective.2 I study the price-setting problem of a
principal faced with a monopoly with unknown costs. The principal is endowed
with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency rises with the effort
exerted by a regulator and a judge, whom hereafter I shall call supervisors.
Supervisors respond to implicit (or accountability) incentives and intrinsic (or
legacy) motivations. Implicit incentives force supervisors to select effort looking
at the ballot box (the preferences of their professional peers) if elected (appointed)
but not at the pricing rule selected by the principal. The model predicts that, under
a mild condition on the common random ability, elected supervisors exert more
effort than appointed ones. This election-driven populist (or pandering) drift is
complementary to that proposed by Besley and Coate (2003). The latter claim
that, by unbundling policy issues, election reduces the influence of industry
interests. Also, the pandering incentives I identify are fuelled (curbed) by judges’
fairness motivations (regulators’ desire to obtain job offers from the industry).
Increasing the equilibrium effort, election decreases the expected probability that
the planner remains uninformed. This leads to lower expected rates. So election is
undoubtedly better than appointment from a static efficiency point of view. Yet, if
investment concerns enter the picture, the comparison between the two methods
2

The two most relevant contributions in this literature are the comparison between accountable

and nonaccountable public agents proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2007) and the Maskin and
Tirole’s (2004) analysis of career and legacy concerns in politics.
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becomes uncertain. Indeed, I show that, if the regulatory selection rule is chosen
by one of two political parties, investment concerns and the avoidance of the
distortions created by the funding of investment aids are complementary in
enhancing the likelihood of a reform toward appointment. Besides, the latter is
sensible to the tightness of the political competition.
Consistent with the model’s prediction, state-level panel data from the US electric
power market confirm that reforms toward election of regulators are associated
with less abundant regulatory resources, less expensive generation, and closer
political competition. I also find evidence that rates are lower and respond less to
cost shocks in states electing their regulators or their High Court judges.
There are three main contributions by this paper. First, following the footsteps of
a lively literature on endogenous political institutions (Aghion et al., 2004; Aidt
and Giovannoni, 2005), I identify the normative and positive determinants of
regulatory regime reforms.3 To this extent, the evidence confirms the basic idea,
proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2008), that appointment outperforms election
if time inconsistency (in this case, in investment) is a real issue.
Second, the empirical analysis adds significantly to the literature about the
systematic differences in the policies pursued by appointed and elected officials.4
3

Hanssen (2004a) provides a first empirical and theoretical account of the relation among political

strategic dynamics and institutional reforms. Holburn and Vanden Bergh (2006) and Falaschetti
(2007) provide some evidence from regulatory data of the relevance of the forces identified in the
present paper. Enikolopov (2007) performs the same exercise on US local governments.
4

Besley and Coate (2003) review a first cross-sectional tradition analyzing the US electric power

market, and report, for the first time, panel evidence confirming the idea that states electing their
regulators enjoy lower rates. Leaver (2004), Holburn and Spiller (2002), and Fremeth and Holburn
(2007) report similar evidence employing panels of rate reviews.

4
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In contrast to previous studies, not only I endogenize the choice of selection rules
but I also consider judicial appointment as a possible determinant of prices.5 To
this extent, my results constitute one of the first accounts of the relation between
judicial institutions and regulatory policies (see also Besley and Payne, 2005).
Third, the paper is complementary to a recent interesting literature explaining the
use of regulation as opposed to independent courts as a function of the incentives
faced by judges and regulators themselves (Glaeser et al., 2001).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
institutions governing the pricing process in the US electric power market as an
example of the general setting studied in the model. Section 3 clarifies the effect
of supervisors’ incentives and motivations on regulated rates. Section 4 studies
the efficiency and strategic determinants of regulatory reforms. Section 5 presents
the empirical work. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs, tables and a detailed
description of the data are gathered in the Appendix.

2. Institutions
Investor-owned electric power utilities (IOUs hereafter) account for over threefourths of the electricity sales of the US electricity market. While jurisdiction over
both interstate transmission and wholesale transactions lies with a federal body––
the FERC, retail services are regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs
hereafter). The latter deal with several markets (telecommunications, natural gas,
5

The empirical test in Falaschetti (2007) is a first attempt to endogenize regulatory rules. Besley

and Payne (2005) and Hanssen (2000) show that states appointing judges have respectively fewer
discrimination charges and higher litigation rates. Helland and Tabarrok (2002) show that elected
judges redistribute wealth from out-of-state businesses to in-state plaintiffs (i.e., voters).

5
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper214

6

Guerriero: Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory

insurance, water, etc.) and perform several tasks (for example, they suggest lines
of conduct on service provision, design environmental regulations and so on),
among which price-setting is the most relevant. IOUs are not allowed to receive
government subsidies and, therefore, regulated two-part tariffs should cover
average costs in order to assure the firms’ viability. As a consequence, rates have
traditionally been linked to those average costs recognized as reimbursable during
rate reviews. The latter are generally triggered by utilities in response to cost
shocks, and sometimes initiated periodically by the PUC (Friedman, 1991).
Two-tier hearings and supervisors’ roles.–– Rate reviews follow a precise routine
composed of two levels of formal quasi-judicial hearings open to all interested
parties (firms; ratepayers, along with their state-funded advocates; PUC staff;
interest groups, etc).6 First, commissioners––the heads of the PUCs––sit on the
bench; next, if the filing is not approved or some party finds him/herself
mistreated, a High Court judge (usually sitting in a state supreme court) is asked
to rule the case. The appeal is on law and fact and “with so much at stake,
[judicial review] is a very real possibility” (Gormley, 1983).
A huge body of press testimonies and empirical results highlights the critical and
often undervalued relevance of judicial review. As Gormley (1983) reports, the
appellate rate of PUC decisions reached between 1974 and 1979 the considerably
mean level of 37.4 percent (with a 1976 peak of 52.3 percent),7 and that the share
of partially reversed cases was 43.5 percent. Teske et al. (2004, ch. 15) report

6

Here, I follow Friedman (1991, pp. 92 – 98), CDRA (1992, pp. 52 – 68) and Gormley (1983, pp.

92 – 98) whose overviews are highly consistent with those available on the PUCs’ websites.
7

As noticed by Hanssen (2004a), the share of appealed decisions underestimates the “activist”

judges’ effect, being the likelihood of an appeal itself a function of judges’ incentives.
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similar figures for the period 1995-1996, when the mean appellate rate was thirtysix percent and the share of partially reversed cases thirty-five percent.
During the hearings, the role of commissioners and judges is one of supervision:
they examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence and interpret prevailing
precedents and regulations.8 The final motion to be approved, instead, is proposed
de facto by the PUC’s staff, who act as the jury in a typical Anglo-American
adversarial trial––the reason being that decisions should always be reached in “an
open and fair manner” (CDRA, 1992).9 This latter feature, along with the fact that
the complete record of the hearings is widely publicized and all interested parties
participate, assures that only if “hard” evidence––such that “every interested party
can convince himself that [the judgment] corresponds to the true state of the
world” (Laffont, 2000)––is obtained does the review end.
Accordingly, I set up a model in which rates are selected by a planner obtaining
orthogonal and truthful signals on the firm’s technology from the search activity of
a regulator and a judge. This fictional planner represents the Coasian bargaining

among interested players necessary to make price changes acceptable.
Supervisors’ incentives.–– Media carefully track the evolution of electricity files,
which in turn represent some of the most advertised tasks over which regulators
and judges are selected. High (state supreme and circuit) court judges and public
8

“The judge just listens attentively. If it speaks, it will be to rule, at the request of the party or on

his own motion, on the admissibility of a question put to a witness or a party or to ensure
adherence to the rules of the game” (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, pp. 272–273).
9

Commissioners consider the staff as the most influential hearing actor (Gormley, 1983; Teske et

al., 2004, ch. 4). While a part (trial staff) suggests a pre-hearing position, another (advisory staff)
proposes the final motion (CDRA, 1992). Furthermore, courts usually examine the staff before
issuing the judgment (Gormley, 1983).
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utility commissioners are either elected or appointed, and appointment rules are
reformed at the state government level.
Coherently, I assume that supervisors are rewarded on the basis of the extent of
hard information (reported in the docket official papers) they obtain during the
hearings. In addition, I model the role of selection rules and of regulatory and
judiciary specific motivations in the pricing process. Finally, I also posit that
selection rules are chosen by political parties faced with election uncertainty.

3. Accountable Supervisors and Regulated Rates
Building on the institutions introduced above, the model takes its approach from
Laffont (2000) and incorporates a (possibly partisan) planner and two implicitly
and intrinsically motivated supervisors.

3.1 The Basic Model
Preferences and Information.–– The regulated firm produces a variable scale
product q , charging a two-part tariff A  pq with q , A and p being strictly
positive. Total cost is  q . The marginal cost  is equal to  with probability v
and to  with probability 1  v . Let       0 . Consumers share the same
preferences, and the demand is that of a representative consumer. Let S  q  , p 
P  q   S   q  , q  D  p  and R  q   P  q  q  A label the gross surplus, inverse and

regular demand functions, and the firm’s revenue. Consumers choose q to
maximize the net surplus S  q   A  pq and A is fixed optimally to make them
indifferent between buying or not: that is, A  S  q   P  q  q . The firm’s utility is

8
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U  t   q and a reservation level of 0 is required. The firm’s revenues must cover

managerial rewards t and, thus, A  pq  p   t .
The planner’s problem.–– Ex post social welfare W is the sum of the net
consumer surplus and of the firm’s utility. The firm’s budget constraint is
evaluated at the shadow price of the managerial rewards 1   and, consequently,
W  S  q  p    A  pq  p   U  1     A  pq  p   t  .

1

Let V  q  denotes the social surplus brought about by the production of q . Given
that the good is private, V is the sum of the consumers’ net surplus plus the
firm’s revenue, computed at the shadow price 1   (because it helps to fulfill the
firm’s budget constraint). So, V  q    S  q   R  q    1    R  q   1    S  q  with V  0 
 0 V   0 , V   0 .

10

So the strictly concave planner’s objective in 1 re-writes as:

W  V  q   1    q  U .

 2

Under complete information about  the planner achieves the optimal allocation
V   q*   1    and no rent is left to the firm (see the Appendix). Instead, under

asymmetric information, the planner offers the firm a menu of incentive
compatible pairs  t , q  trading off informational rent extraction and allocative
distortion.11 Let

10

 t , q,U  ,  t , q ,U  denote managerial rewards, output and utility of

Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) suggest that A here covers a role similar to the governmental

transfers in Laffont and Tirole (1993). Thus, my analysis is formally similar to the latter when
reimbursement is intended operated through regulated prices. In the present case, the shadow cost
of public funds is replaced by the marginal deadweight loss from a rise in the fixed fee.
11

Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for firm  (  ) is the one preferred

by  (  ) in the menu of  t , q  pairs or: t   q  t   q  IC _ H  and t   q  t   q  IC _ L  .

9
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the high and low-cost firms. Incentive compatibility and individual rationality
implies a binding high cost firm’s individual rationality constraint

 IR _ L 

U  t  q  0 ,

and a binding low cost firm’s incentive compatibility constraint

 IC _ H 

U  t   q  U   q   q   q .

Thus, under asymmetric information, expected social welfare is



W  v V q  1    q   q   1  v  V  q   1    q  .



 3

Except for the expected rent v q , the problem is the same as in  2  . To assure
incentive compatibility, the planner grants an informational rent to the low cost
firm (whose allocation is still optimal) and distorts the high cost firm’s allocation.
Define   x   x 1  x  with   0 . The low cost firm contract is now given by

 

 

v
V  qˆ  1    S  qˆ  1     
  1       v   .
1 v

 4

The first term in the equality has the measure of a price. Therefore, expected rents
are completely passed through on prices, and all the differences in expected rates
with respect to the first best are determined by the high cost firm’s allocation.
The supervision technology.–– Let me now introduce two supervisors (a regulator
and a judge) who, exerting costly effort, produce two independent signals that are
observed by the planner. The signals’ precision is  l with l  R, J  . If    , with
probability  l the planner sees  and implements the full information contract
and with probability 1  l she observes  . If, instead,    , then she always
observes  . The planner assures a reservation utility r to the two supervisors,
who always participate in the game and are not allowed to side contract with each
other. The regulator moves first. If the planner remains uninformed, the judge

10
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generates an orthogonal signal with the same structure.12 Supervisors are
evaluated on the observable but not contractible  l , whose technology is
multiplicative in the random (common) ability   0,1 and in the unobservable
effort el  0,1 : that is, l   el .13
The parameter  is drawn from a distribution with mean  , variance  2 and
density f independent of el . In order to narrow down the possible cases, I shall
concentrate on the class of the canonical, non degenerate, continuous distributions
supported on a bounded interval and with hump-shaped density: that is, Beta,
generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, inverted U-quadratic, and truncated
normal (see Johnson et al., 1994). Moreover, I shall assume that:
A1: When f is truncated normal     1                1 2 , where
 is the standard normal cumulative function.

The assumption assures that, for all the distribution in the class, the density f is
not too flat at the mean, and, in particular, that f    1 . As a result, the marginal
probability of drawing a supervisor with less than average talent is not too low. In
the most sensible case, in which there are no extreme types and f  0   f 1  0 ––
Beta, generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, and inverted U-quadratic––the

12

This set-up captures, in the case of the US electricity market, on one side, the nature of the

evidence processing (which is de facto devolved upon the staff), and, on the other, the nature of
judicial reviews (new hearings leading to de novo decisions).
13

The effort has to be correctly considered as net of all the activities intended to hide valuable

information. A multiplicative technology avoids the tiresome qualifications that an additive one
needs: the choice, however, is immaterial. If the performance is any continuous and increasing
function of the precision (e.g., expected social welfare), all the results remain unaffected.
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requirement is always met (proofs available from the author).14 When, instead,
this is not the case (truncated normal) the regularity on the measure of completely
skilled and unskilled types, contained in A1, is required. Overall, this last
assumption has to be considered as an essentially mild one given the high
complexity and the fast changing nature of the regulation task.
Supervisors’ objective functions.–– As suggested by Maskin and Tirole (2004), I
suppose that supervisors respond to both implicit incentives and intrinsic
motivations: they not only value being in office for its own sake but also wish to
leave a legacy. In other words, not only being reappointed or re-elected brings
valuable perquisites or satisfies tastes for influence (implicit incentives), but
supervisors want to be remembered for great things they have accomplished for
society at large, or of a part of it (intrinsic motivations). Therefore, I posit that a
supervisor’s utility depends on both her identity and the degree of accountability
to which she is subjected. Therefore, a generic supervisor’s interim (relative to the
moment in which she exerts effort) utility function writes as





Ri ,l  ei ,l , S   1  1  SR  G i  ei ,l   1  1  S  J  1  K  C  ei ,l  r ,

 5

where i   A, E indexes the appointment rule to which she is subjected. K   0,1
is an efficiency of the information gathering technology parameter, and the effort
cost function is such that C  0   0 , C  0 , C  0    , lime

i ,l 1

C   ei ,l    , C  0 .

The term in square brackets represents the non-monetary bonus obtained over and
above r . In addition, the shape of the implicit reward function G i differentiates
appointed from elected officials and S distinguishes regulators from judges (in
14

Some non-continuous distributions in the same class (for example, triangular) have the same

property. To be hump-shaped, the Beta and Kumaraswamy need to have parameters greater than 1.
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particular, it is equal to 1 for a regulator and 0 for a judge). In order to grasp a
deeper understanding of nonmonetary incentives, I shall leave aside signalling
and money-burning incentives and, consequently, assume that supervisors select
effort before knowing their random ability. Then, nature chooses  . Next, the
outcomes are observed and the nonmonetary rewards inclusive utility paid.
For what concerns implicit incentives, I embrace the distinction between
politicians and bureaucrats proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2007): while
elected officials are held accountable by voters, at election time, those appointed
are accountable to their professional peers or to society for the way they fulfill the
goals of their organization. In particular, appointed officials want to maximize the
conditional perception of their ability. Therefore, if E  denotes the supervisor’s
unconditional expectation over  A,l , E the evaluator’s expectation over α
conditional on  A,l and the (correct in equilibrium) evaluator’s expectation over
effort eAexp,l , then G A  eA,l   E  E   A,l , eAexp,l  . Turning to voters, they realize that the


alternative to the incumbent is an average talented official exerting effort eEexp,l ; so,
the incumbent is re-elected if the realized performance is greater than E ,l   eEexp,l or







 . Both the market value of talent and office

G E  eE ,l   Pr  E ,l  E ,l  Pr    eEexp,l eE ,l 

holding are normalized to 1.
Turning to intrinsic motivations, J   0,1 and R   0,1 measure the “fairness” and
the “revolving-door” motivations. Political and legal scholars have assumed that
judges try to make the (ex post) correct decision in order to signal their fairness
and commitment. For instance, Miceli and Coşgel (1994) envision that judges
suffer a utility loss when overturned and gain utility when cited. The disclosure of

13
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the firm’s information, instead, is less appealing for officials attracted by future
job opportunities in the industry. As Quirk (1981) shows, more pro-industry US
federal regulators anticipate enhanced chances of working for the regulated firm
(see also Gormley, 1983). So I assume that the judges’ cost of effort (regulators’
implicit rewards) decreases with J ( R ). Finally, notice that the revolving-door
effect does not seem to exist for judges.
The timing.–– The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Society (that is, planner, supervisors and the firm) learns the nature of the
regulatory environment ( P ,    ,  ). Next, the firm discovers the value of θ.
2. The planner offers the firm a menu of  t , q  pairs. If it declines, the game ends.
3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; then she discovers the value of  .
Next, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative, the first best is
implemented. If the planner remains uninformed, the judge moves.
4. Step 3 is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the firm reports
its information to the planner.
5. A reward-quantity pair is implemented. Finally, the signals’ precisions are
revealed and each supervisor is rewarded.
Implicit incentives build into the model a division of power structure: officials
care about their evaluators’ moves but not about the pricing rule selected by the
planner. This has three consequences. First, implicit incentives reduce the scope
for side-contracts between the firm and the supervisors, because the former has to
reimburse nonmonetary rewards to the latter. Second, if the firm’s informational
rent is not only a loss, as it is in equation  3 , supervisors’ and planner’s goals can
collide. Third, the basic equilibrium can easily be obtained by looking separately

14
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at the supervisors’ effort choice and at the planner’s pricing rule selection. Before
looking in the detail at the first two points, I shall illustrate the last one.

3.2 Implicit Incentives, Intrinsic Motivations and Equilibrium Prices
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The latter is characterized
by a tuple of equilibrium efforts (one for each possible supervisor’s type) and a
menu of

 t , q  pairs contingent on the signals’ realizations. Proceeding by

backward induction, the solution to the supervisors’ problem implies that:
LEMMA 1: Label the regulators’ (judges’) selection rule with i ( j ). Each
supervisor’s problem has a unique and interior solution. In addition, equilibrium
efforts eˆi , j are such that, for all f in the class considered: (1) eˆi ,R R  0i ,
eˆ j , J J  0, j

, eˆi ,l K  0i, l and eˆ j ,l K  0j, l ; (2) under A1, eˆE ,l  eˆA,l , l .

Point 1 underscores not only the role of a more efficient information-gathering
technology but also the effects of opposite legacy goals: the effort exerted by
supervisors striving to please the industry (to be ex-post correct) tends to decrease
(increase) as the congruency with original tasks fades away. Even more crucially,
point 2 states that, when it is not too easy to substitute an incumbent supervisor
with a mean-ability one (i.e., if A1 holds), an elected supervisor panders to voters
exerting more effort than would an appointed one. Despite the different set up, the
result is driven by incentives similar to the pandering ones identified by Maskin
and Tirole (2004). Lemma 1 also confirms, under the more realistic asymmetric
information assumption, the results obtained by Besley and Coate (2003).15
15

I can easily introduce a bundling incentive here, assuming that appointed regulators have an R

greater than the one of elected regulators. This would only reinforce Point 2. Focusing on

15
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At Stage 2 the planner offers the firm a menu of transfers-quantity pairs fully
characterized by the supervisors’ expected efforts. Let  eˆi ,R  1   eˆi ,R  eˆ j , J   i, j  ,
the planner’s posterior belief on    conditional on two uninformative signals is
Pr     ,   v 1    i, j   1  v  i, j  ,

and her optimum problem (indexed by s i.e., supervision) writes as

 v 1    i, j   
W s  v  i, j W *  1  v  i, j    
V q S  1    q S   q S  


1

v

i
,
j





 




1 v
,
V q S  1    q S  
  2 1    r


1  v  i, j 



 

where W * is the first-best welfare obtained when at least one signal is
informative. The planner evaluates supervisors’ monetary perks at the shadow
cost of public funds 1   and, without loss of generality, does not value implicit
incentives. All the novelties in the optimum problem, which has a unique and
positive solution, are contained in the expected ex post probability of at least an
informative signal   i, j  . The equilibrium high cost firm’s allocation is given by:

 

V  qˆ S  1       v  1    i, j   .

 6

Clearly, the hierarchical hearings structure is useful and the allocative distortion is
partially curbed with respect equation  4  (i.e., qˆ  qˆ S  q* ). In particular, given
that   i, j  does increase with both eˆi , R and eˆ j , J , the following holds true:
PROPOSITION 1: Regulated prices are decreasing with the efficiency of the

normally distributed talent observable with noise, Alesina and Tabellini (2007) show that a
sufficiently high uncertainty over talent implies patterns opposite to those in Point 2. This is not
realistic in the present instance: dockets are widely publicized (so that talent is observed without
noise) and supervisors’ curricula vitae are consistent one with the other (small ability dispersion).
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information-gathering technology K , greater (lower) the stronger regulators’
(judges’) implicit motivations are and (under A1) lower if supervisors are elected.
When the expected probability of informative signals rises, the planner optimally
relaxes the allocative distortion, and this, in turn, implies lower expected rates. So
complementarities between supervisors’ implicit and the firm’s explicit incentives
endogenously arise from the contractibility of the firm’s allocation, as opposed to
the noncontractibility of the supervisors’ performance (see also Guerriero, 2008).
Fairness motivations fuel the pattern while revolving-door concerns limit it.
Remark.–– Suppose that, between Stages 1 and 5, an input costs shock hits high
and low average costs so that their ex ante expected difference becomes 1     .
Then, Proposition 1 describes, in the same qualitatively way, the determinants of
the pass-through of cost-shocks  into prices  V   qˆ S      v  1    i, j   .

3.3 Robustness: Lobbying and Bribery
The appeal of this result lies not only in the sensibility of the model’s premises
which bridge nonmonetary incentives to the asymmetry in technological information
but also in the realism of their consequences. Studying a similar environment, the
new regulatory economics (Laffont and Martimort, 1999; Laffont, 2000) obtains
collusion-proof equilibria in which monetary perks equal to the firm’s expected
stake are given to explicitly interested supervisors to avoid corruption. The pattern
matches a consistent evidence on regulatory reforms which has clarified the
narrow role of capture (see Gormley, 1983; Teske et al., 2004, ch. 4) but it is
completely at odds with any observed regulatory contracts. On the contrary, the
above equilibrium not only has similar collusion proofness properties, but also
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http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper214

18

Guerriero: Accountability in Government and Regulatory Policies: Theory

builds on the observed residual rights nature of supervisors’ activities.16 To clarify
the point, I consider the lobbying game proposed by Alesina and Tabellini (2008)
and based on the observation that supervisors exert effort in other tasks.
The firms’ lobby tries to divert supervisors’ effort from information-gathering to
the fulfillment of a second task (e.g., to avoid by-passing by non-regulated firms)
whose technology is hi ,l   eih,l , and whose benefits are negligible for consumers
and  hi ,l (   0 ) for the firm. As in Alesina and Tabellini (2008), the planner does
not foresee equilibrium capture and cannot condition his choice––i.e., the rule
giving price as a function of average costs––on collusive activities.  is truncated
normally distributed, and the effort cost function is additive in the effort devoted
to the two tasks. Also, the lobby, whose vote is irrelevant, has all the bargaining
power and, in Stage 2 , can commit to bribes bi ,l and/or campaign funds

nE ,l

(to

elected supervisors only) to be paid after Stage 5 . These influence instruments are
contracts contingent on effort, but bribes are illegal. If a supervisor accepts them
with probability   0 she is caught and pays a fine M  0 . If   0 measures the
value of implicit rewards relative to illegal bribes, supervisors’ utility rewrites as











RiC,l (eiC,l , eih,l , S )  1   1  SR  Gi eiC,l , eih,l  1  1  S  J  1  K  C eiC,l  eih,l  r  bi ,l   M

where the index

C

,

stands for capture. Implicit rewards are the same as before if

appointment is used, but differ if election is employed. Campaign funds lower
voters’ reservation utility to  eEexp,l  H  nE ,l  with H  0  0 , H   0 , H   0 . The lobby’s
indirect utility is



 



U  v 1   C  i, j   qˆ s ,C   E  eˆih, R  eˆhj , J   bˆi , R  bˆj , J   nˆE ,R  nˆE , J 

with

hats indicating equilibrium values. The subgame equilibrium of the menu auction
16

Over the period 1980-1997, for instance, IOUs’ average revenues from retail sales were 1.94

billion dollars while commissioners’ average salaries were 59,774 dollars.
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bribing game and of the lobbying game are jointly optimal for the lobby and the
supervisor, given the evaluators’ expectations. Tedious algebra (proofs available
from the author) shows that, for  sufficiently large, appointed supervisors never
accept bribes, and that the lobby prefers to be ex-ante passive rather than pay
bribes if the firm’s stake is too narrow or legal systems work efficiently, that is
 M is large. Strong (weak) fairness (revolving door) motivations favor capture-

free equilibria. Also, full-capture equilibria with positive campaign funds are
never optimal because supervisors always lose elections, and the lobby is not
willing to offer campaign aids if money is not very effective in swaying votes,
i.e., H  is small. So strong implicit incentives and/or an inefficient corruption
technology make the equilibrium in Proposition 1 endogenously collusion-proof.

4. Endogenous Regulatory Institutions
So far, the analysis suggests that election should be used whenever the selected
performance is sufficiently informative about supervisors’ random ability. The
picture, however, is incomplete, because the model completely abstracts from the
consequences that selection rules have on the firm’s investment incentives. From
this (dynamic efficiency) point of view, the role of appointment rules is twofold.
On one hand, as the next section shows, the firm’s ex post rents and so its
incentives to invest rise with supervisors’ efforts and so with election. On the other
hand, however, ex post rents also worsen the burden of those performance-based

aids implemented by governments to encourage investment ex post.17 In this

17

These are, for instance, all those incentive regulations “designed to encourage [...] certain

investments (e.g., network modernization or energy efficiency [...])” (Basheda et al., 2001).
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perspective, regulatory reforms should balance the eventual dynamic inefficiency
in investment with the distortions driven by the funding of aids. Moreover, this
efficiency trade-off creates also political incentives. Indeed, ex post rents arise a
conflict among consumers, if only some of them own the firm’s shares. This, in
turn, makes regulatory reforms inefficiently sensible to political competition if
ratepayer and shareholder groups have political power.
In the next section I consider the two elements together, assuming that institutions
are designed, between Stages 1 and 2 (just before the planner chooses the pricing
rule), by one of two political parties––the pro-shareholder R or the pro-consumer
D . Each party faces electoral uncertainty and can favor its constituency directly

through investment aids and indirectly through regulatory regime reforms.

4.1 Efficiency-Driven and Strategic Appointment Rules Reforms
The analysis applies to both types of public officials. Nevertheless, being judges
responsible for several non-regulatory tasks (e.g., anti-discrimination charges),
the main focus will be on the method of selecting regulators. For simplicity, I also
assume that the planner cannot commit to reimburse investment costs.18
The investment game set up.–– The appointment rule is selected by the incumbent
party m  D, R . After Stage 2, but before the firm eventually commits to the
investment, an election with exogenous winning probabilities xm is held and the
winner selects the size of an investment aid. The aid assumes the form of a

18

Even if the used and useful doctrine partially assures against non commitment, the hypothesis is

the more appropriate in mature markets (such as electricity) where retaliation by the firm could not
be very damaging (Newbery, 2000, ch. 2). Under commitment, the main results continue to hold.
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subsidy financed from distortionary taxes, equal to a fixed portion m  1 of the
invested capital and paid to the firm after the investment is implemented.
The investment requires a fixed monetary cost I  0 and has a stochastic return
with expected value      1     0 with   0   ,   0 . The firm is
infinitively risk averse in the range of the ex-post negative utilities. So, in the
investment regime (notice the apex I ), only the low cost firm invests if
 qˆ S , I mˆ   I  0 where mˆ  D, R indexes the winning party. The latter is the case

even if perfect financial markets are available, provided that  I   qˆ S ,I  mˆ  1 .
The reformer’s utility.–– Each party attaches to the ex-post participation (to the
investment game) constraint the weight   0 and evaluates the expected aid at
the shadow price of public funds. The static versus dynamic efficiency trade-off is
summarized by  , and investment and taxation distortions concerns are balanced
by the party specific parameters  m and m . While m picks up the party’s
aversion to impose higher taxes,  m captures the party’s willingness to leave
higher ex post rents to the shareholders constituency.
All in all, the incumbent m ’s indirect utility writes as a function of eˆi , R only as
Wˆ S , I  eˆi , R   1    v  x   m   1   m xˆ    eˆi , R   Wˆ S , I  eˆi , R   1    vm   eˆi , R  ,

where the first term on the left is the expected ex post welfare, x
   D xD 
ˆ    D  1 xD    R  1 xR ,   eˆi , R   1    i, j   qˆ S , I . Finally, I
 R xR , x

shall impose the following restrictions on the exogenous parameters:
A2: a.  R   D  1 ;  D   x   R  0 ; 1  R  D  0 ; max  D ,  R  
min  D ,  R 

Wˆ S , I  eˆ   Wˆ S , I  eˆ   eˆ

  R  1 xR 1    ;   1 ;    .


E ,R
E ,R
i,R
max 
,1 ; b.  
p ,q
ˆ
1    R  1 xR
   eˆE , R     eˆE , R  W eˆi , R 
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Interpretation.–– In interpreting the foregoing, several observations should be
borne in mind. First, the analysis applies unchanged if the aid is not nonmonetary
and  is replaced by  , or, generally, by a shadow price of the incumbent party’s
effort. Second, the fact that the winning party cannot reform the appointment rule
captures lags and the commitment periods typical of regulation.19
Third, the assumption (A2.a) that the pro-shareholder party selects a higher level
of aid and cares more about distortionary taxation and investment inducement is
in the spirit of those models of electoral competition in which candidates commit
to well-defined policies well ahead of elections and then stick to them (see
Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 3). To this extent, the last inequality in Point 1 of
A2 simply requires that the platforms of the two parties are sufficiently distant.
Fourth, the idea that distortionary taxation is per se more relevant than investment
inducement (first inequality A2.b) captures, in reduced form, the bundling effect
advocated by Besley and Coate (2003) and it is a mild restriction to impose when
other more salient policies are part of the political platform.
Finally, the last two inequalities in A2.b are extremely natural requirements in the
present set up and they simply ask that the inverse demand is inelastic (which is
the empirically relevant case for a regulated good which is usually a necessity),20
and that for each party, despite its ideological motivations, dynamic efficiency
concerns are sufficiently relevant with respect to static efficiency ones.
Equilibrium.–– The incumbent m prefers election to appointment if:
19

According to NARUC data, over the period 1974-1990 the mean duration of electricity hearings

has been 9 months (see also Friedman, 1991). Moreover, when a regulatory docket is closed, the
resulting contract typically specifies a commitment period of five years (Basheda et al., 2001).
20

Notice, that the opposite always holds true for quadratic and CES (CRRA) utilities.
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 Wˆ S  eˆE , R   Wˆ S  eˆA, R   1    v  x   m  1     m xˆ    eˆA, R     eˆE , R  .



7

Applying the envelope theorem to both sides of the inequality, it is easy to see
that, as discussed above, the effect of a change in one of the exogenous
parameters R , K , xD , xR on the likelihood of a reform toward election is twofold.
The first effect is driven by static efficiency worries and it goes through the
derivative with respect to eˆi , R of the left-hand side. The second effect is related to
dynamic efficiency concerns, and goes through the derivative with respect to eˆi , R
of the right-hand side. While the first effect is clearly positive, the sign of second
is ambiguous. Indeed,  is composed by two terms: the expected probability of
two uninformative signals and the ex-post rent. While the latter increases with eˆi , R
because more information calls for less allocative distortions, the former falls
with the probability of a first informative signal, and so with eˆi , R . Yet, as the
Appendix shows,  eˆi ,R is unambiguously determined if  p,q  1 .
The following Lemma summarizes the relation among  , R and K :21
LEMMA 2: If  p,q  1 then  eˆi,R  0 and, under A1,
  eˆA, R  R  0

and

  eˆE , R     eˆA, R  ,   eˆE , R  R 

  eˆE , R  K    eˆA, R  K  0 .

Lemma 2 brings two main consequences. First, a change in each of the exogenous
parameters has impacts different in sign on the static and dynamic efficiency parts
of the reformer’s utility. Nevertheless, if reformers are sufficiently investment
concerned (that is, if    ), it can be shown (see the Appendix) that the total
effect is unambiguous, and dynamic efficiency prevails on static one. Second, the
21

Notice the complementarity (substitutability) among the efficiency of the information-gathering

technology (revolving-door motivations) and implicit incentives in enhancing efforts.
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finding that  eˆi,R  0 , along with the fact that  m is always negative under A2,
assures that both parties have an incentive to select appointment, provided that 
is not too big or    . The last inequality in A2 ensures that    ; therefore,
the determinants of selection rules reforms are completely identified as follows:
PROPOSITION 2: Provided that both A1 and A2 hold, a  does exists, with
     : such that for    (      ) appointment (election) is always

preferred, and for      either one or the other can be chosen. In the last
case, the incumbent’s preferences toward election (A) rise with  , are stronger
(weaker), the stronger are revolving-door motivations (is the efficiency of the
information-gathering technology and (B) the incumbent’s hold on power). The
incumbent’s identity has an ambiguous effect on her preferences toward election.
Proposition 2 (whose proof is reported in the Appendix) stresses the existence of
two determinants of selection rules: a trade-off between dynamic inconsistency
and distortionary taxation (A) and a strategic incentive to tie the rival party’s
hands, coming from election uncertainty (B). The former survives if politics is
completely shut down and implies a clear-cut normative result: a reformer
worried by dynamic efficiency should opt for election if technological and
institutional characteristics render ineffective pandering incentives.
For what concerns the second incentive, a considerable body of political economy
literature (see, for example, Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Hanssen, 2004a) claims
that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to implement
institutional reforms either to influence political outcomes or to limit the actions
of future incumbents: selection rule reforms are a case in point. In particular, an
increase in the probability of being elected and consequently fixing a higher
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(lower) investment aid fosters party R ’s ( D ’s) incentives to select appointment in
order to curb the distortions deriving from taxation (being investment concerns
lower, in a stochastic sense).
Remark.–– If implicit rewards are G E  1    G A , Proposition 2 can be intended as
stating the reformer’s preferences over the power  ––in terms of pandering
enhancing incentives––of different selection rules.
If A1 and A2 hold and with P and  held constant, Propositions 1 and 2, along
with their related remarks, can be restated as testable predictions, as follows:
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS: The likelihood of a reform toward more powerful
pandering institutions will (1) increase with the strength of revolving-door
motivations, (2) falls with the efficiency of the information-gathering technology
and with society’s investment concerns, and (3) be greater, the weaker is the
incumbent hold on power. The effect of the reformer’s identity is ambiguous. (4)
Both prices and the pass-through of cost shocks will decrease with the efficiency
of the information-gathering technology, rise (fall) the stronger are regulators’
(judges’) implicit motivations, and be lower if supervisors are elected.
Next, I look first at the determinants of regulatory selection procedures and then
examine the endogenous impact of supervisors’ implicit incentives on prices.

5. Evidence
To evaluate the model’s predictions, I require, first of all, a comparable sample of
institutions that vary in their effect on supervisors’ pandering incentives. To this
extent, I consider the procedure of selecting public utility commissioners and
High Court judges, and I rank each rule in terms of pandering incentives. There
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are seven methods of selecting commissioners: direct election, appointment by
Governor, gubernatorial appointment with approval by the Senate or the executive
council,22 gubernatorial appointment with approval by Legislature, and selection
by Legislature/General Assembly. There are five judicial selection rules: partisan
and nonpartisan election, appointment by Governor or Legislature, and merit plan.
Ranking pandering incentives.–– It is widely accepted that partisan elections turns
public officials into politicians: “candidates are chosen in party primaries make
campaign speeches, seek political contributions (parties are a major source of
campaign funds), and so forth” (Hanssen, 2004a). An equally strong consensus
holds that the most independent judges are those subject to the merit plan, which
avoids competitive elections or appointment but mandates unopposed retention
elections (Hanssen, 2004a).23 By the same token, regulators selected through the
consensus of both houses can be considered the most insulated from political
competition, as they are not directly attached to the party of the Governor. The
other procedures are less easily ranked in terms of pandering incentives.
Thus I posit that the value of the following two ordered indicators increases with
the power (in terms of pandering incentives) of regulatory and judicial selection
rules: Reg_Ord equal to one if commissioners are selected with the approval of
both state houses (i.e., with one of the last three rules listed above), three if direct
election is employed and two otherwise; Jud_Ord indicator equal to one if the
merit plan is used, three if the state uses partisan elections, and two otherwise. In

22

This is a state house in New Hampshire, and a board selected by the majority party in Ohio.

23

Non-partisan judicial election forbids candidates to reveal their party affiliation. Besley and

Payne (2005) claim that the merit plan is the more accountability enhancing rule because of the
retention procedure, yet, sitting judges almost never lose these elections (see Hanssen, 2004a).
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order to evaluate the relation between pandering incentives and prices, I shall use,
instead, the binaries Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec which equal one if direct election is
employed and 0 otherwise.24 The analysis considers a panel of forty-nine states
for the period 1970-1997.25 During the sample, some states altered their rules (see
Table 1): this provides time-series and cross-sectional variation to exploit.

5.1 Non Random Appointment Rules Selection
In order to fully exploit the three-dimensional variation (over time, across states and
across power levels) in pandering enhancing institutions, I estimate two models. Both
models aim at explaining the probability of reforms toward more powerful rules. 26

Empirical strategy.–– The first model is the following multinomial logit





Pr yi ,t  k zi ,t  exp  k zit 



3
k 1

exp  k zit  ,

where the dependent yit is Reg_Ord.27 The second model is the ordered logit:
yi ,t  k if  k 1  yi*,t   k for yi*,t   zit   it and k  1, 2 ,

where  k are unknown parameters and yit is either Reg_Ord or Jud_Ord. In both
models, zit gathers the eventually time-varying proxies for supervisors’ intrinsic

24

South Carolina and Tennessee changed their rules in 1996. I consider both to be electing given

that Tennessee retained its commissioners. My results do not change if I use a different definition.
25

Because of a lack of data, Nebraska and the District of Columbia are not considered. For the

same reason, the period 1960-1969 (included in Besley and Coate, 2003) is not considered. Yet
unbalanced panels deliver similar results. The same is true when the switching states are left out.
26

The strategy embraced is also driven by the lack of within variation in many controls. Yet the

coefficients of the time-varying covariates are qualitatively similar if a fixed effects logit is run.
27

In order to save space, the multinomial logit with dependent Jud_Ord is not reported. Its results

are qualitatively similar to those of the ordered logit with dependent Jud_Ord.
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motivations, the efficiency of the information-gathering technology, society’s
investment concerns and political competition.28 Next, I introduce these proxies,
relating each to the prediction to which it refers.
Measuring the structural determinants of selection rules.–– Let me start from the
first prediction. Following Teske (2004, ch.4), I use a dummy variable equal to

one if there are restrictions on how long a commissioner must wait, after service,
before taking a job in the industry, and zero otherwise (Rev_Door). This should
proxy for less powerful revolving door motivations. I also consider whether
commissioners cannot be of the same party (Bipartisan). The latter proxies for a
less powerful Besley and Coate’s (2003) bundling effect, being linked to less proshareholder appointed regulators. As a result, the prior is that Bipartisan should
display a sign similar to Rev_Door. For what concerns judicial selection, a broad

literature on judicial independence (see Hanssen, 2004a) claims that a longer term
of office increases the judges’ insulation, thus diluting their reputational concerns.
So I consider the length of the judicial term (Jud_Term) as a measure of less
powerful legacy motivations (for a similar choice, see Leaver, 2004).
Focusing on the second prediction, it is reasonable to assume that more abundant
resources and more powerful consumer groups ease information-gathering. The
proxies I use are: the total budget (in thousands of dollars) available to the PUC’s
staff (Budget) and the share of revenues from sales to industrial users (Industrial).
Turning to society’s investment concerns, I assume that a more costly generation
increases society’s interest in more efficient cost-reducing technologies. Thus, I
28

Notice that  7  does not exclude a role for interacted regressors. If I introduce the latter in a logit

model with dependent Reg_Elec, they are usually not significant at a probability of the reform
level of 0 or 0.5 (the drawbacks linked to this specification are discussed in Ai and Norton, 2003).
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include the share of generation from hydroelectric sources (Gen_Hydro) and a
dummy variable equal to one if Reg_Elec has been reformed in state i during the
oil crisis period (Oil_Ref): that is, 1973-1982. The former (latter) should correlate
negatively (positively) with society’s investment concerns.
To test the third prediction, I need a measure of political competition. Embracing
the strategy proposed by Hanssen (2004a), I employ the share of seats held by the
majority party averaged across upper and lower houses (Majority) as a proxy for a
stronger incumbent’s hold on power. I also need a proxy for the incumbent’s
constituency ideology. Several researchers (see Teske, 2004, ch. 4) hold that the
Republican Party historically has been more pro-shareholder: I therefore consider
also whether both houses were under the Republicans’ control (Rep).
Scholars of policy innovation claim that the diffusion of a new policy displays
social learning (see Teske, 2004, ch. 4): after a state has adopted a new institution,
surrounding states are more likely to follow suit. So I introduce the share of
surrounding states electing their regulators (Ereg_Nei) or their judges (Ejud_Nei).
Yet, US states also differ in other dimensions: namely, their tastes for election and
the age of their institutions. While the relevance of the former is self-explanatory,
the latter is of empirical importance because mature PUCs and governments
might have devised formal and informal rules of conduct easing informationgathering in a way that is not captured by Budget or Industrial. These dimensions
are unobservable, and so I use as proxies the year the PUC was founded
(PUC_Fou), the year the state joined the Union (Join), and whether state auditors
are elected (Aud_Elec). Two rule-specific determinants are: whether the PUC was
constitutionally formed (PUC_Con) which proxies for the saliency of regulation,
and whether Jud_Elec is changed in the twentieth century (20th_Jref ) which
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proxies for the development of new judicial appointment rules (see Hanssen,
2004a). I also control for federal policies using the share of generation from
nuclear sources (Gen_Nucl). Variables descriptions, means and standard errors
are listed in Table 2. The Appendix reports variables sources and construction.
Results: regulatory institutions.–– The first panel of Table 3 reports the estimated
marginal effects of the multinomial logit with dependent variable Reg_Ord. For
the most part, the results are consistent with the model’s predictions, and the
implied effects are large. A reform toward the bipartisanship requirement for
appointed regulators reduces the likelihood of direct election by a little more than
18 percent and raises the likelihood of appointment with approval by both houses
by 2 percent. A one-percentage-point increase in the size of the majority is
associated with a 0.021 percentage-point-increase in the likelihood of reforms
toward appointment with approval by both houses.
Focusing on the first two predictions, more abundant resources and those factors
fostering society’s investment concerns lower the likelihood of more powerful
pandering institutions. Only the behaviours of Industrial and Rev_Door do not
match the predictions. The first result could be driven by the fact that watchdog
groups’ special interests could be limiting in spite of ameliorating the quality of
the information-gathering process. The second result is similar to that described in
Teske (2004, ch. 4) and may occur because only the exit phase of the revolving
door is considered. These estimates are significant at least at the 20 percent level.
Turning to the third prediction, less powered institutions are found where the
political competition is tighter and Republican parties seem to dislike direct
election even if the coefficient attached to Rep is not statistically significant. The
data also confirm the supposed learning process, and a one-standard-deviation
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increase (0.271) in Ereg_Nei increases the likelihood of direct elections by a little
more than 11 percent.29 Additionally, more mature institutions and a basic taste
for election tend to decrease the likelihood of lower-powered institutions and
higher values of Gen_Nucl push toward higher powered pandering institutions.
The ordered logit estimates (listed in column 2) deliver similar results. This time,
the proxies for the efficiency determinants are more powerful than those for the
strategic dynamics in explaining the reforms toward higher powered institutions.30
Results: judicial institutions.–– Column 3 lists the estimates of the ordered logit
model with dependent Reg_Ord. As Hanssen (2004a) shows, using an argument
similar to the one devised in Section 4, that the merit plan (partisan election) is
linked to a tighter (less tight) political competition and longer terms curb this
pattern. Column 3 confirms this prediction. Also, even if the effect of a more
efficient information-gathering technology is unexpected, the ordered log-odds of
adopting more powerful rules increase with society’s investment concerns.

5.2 Regulated Prices and Supervisors’ Implicit Incentives
All in all, the distribution of regulatory institutions across American states reflects
both efficiency and forward-looking concerns. This non random assignment of
reforms not only confirms the model’s ideas but also implies that the effect of

29

Notice that, even if the data nicely match the ordered nature of the pandering incentives proxies,

the multinomial logit is per se a model for unordered response variables.
30

The results remain very similar if a dummy for state consumer advocate office, the number of

PUC employees and commissioners, the commissioners’ salary and term of office, state income
per capita, population, proportion of young and old citizens, and regional dummies are introduced.
Clustering the standard errors does not affect the analysis significantly.
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implicit incentives on regulatory policies can be assessed correctly only when
these institutions are treated as endogenous.
States may self-select into election on the bases of unobserved political and
technological shocks fostering investment concerns, as well as of a basic strain in
making acceptable the need for investment to electricity users. If the variation in
selection rules used to explain prices is related to these unexplained determinants
of policies, the OLS estimator becomes biased.
Empirical methodology.–– I conduct two tests: 1. I employ the fixed time and
state effects OLS estimator in order to “minimize concerns about the correlation
between the regulatory regime and other sources of long-run heterogeneity among
the states that drive the selection of the regulatory regime” (Besley and Coate,
2003); and 2. I fully endogenize the effect of supervisors’ implicit incentives
employing a difference GMM estimator. The basic specification is:
yis,t  i  t  1ci ,t  2 Reg _ Eleci ,t ci ,t  3 Jud _ Eleci ,t ci ,t   X i ,t   i ,t .
yis,t is a price in state i and year t defined in terms of revenue per electricity sales

(cents per Kwh) for customer class s . The classes considered are: residential
(Price_R), commercial (Price_C) and industrial (Price_I). i are state-fixed
effects which proxy for time-invariant features of the regulated environment such
as state laws and long-run differences in states’ production systems. t are year
dummies that pick up macro-shocks, industry-wide technological advances and
changes in federal policies. ci ,t is a fossil fuel costs index devised by Besley and
Coate (2003). X i ,t is a vector of time-varying controls. It gathers the time-varying
determinants of selection rules, state population (Pop), shares of population aged
between five and seventeen (Young) and sixty-five and over (Old), and income
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per capita (GSP). Other controls are Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec, population squared and
income per capita squared. These covariates either lack within variation
(Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec) or, if differenced, are collinear with the other covariates
(Pop2 and GSP2): thus, they are not considered in the GMM specification.31
Finally, another crucial explanatory variable is the dependent variable lagged one
period. Hearing lags and the commitment period lead to a certain persistence in
the pricing process and state by state partial autocorrelation functions confirm that
prices are autoregressive of order one.32 Yet, even if uncorrelated with the current
error term, the dependent lagged is correlated with past errors and with the demeaned residual  i ,t   i . Therefore an instrument is needed: this is possible only
in the GMM specification. The details regarding the instruments used to obtain
the moment conditions when this second approach is pursued are discussed
further below. The key implications to be tested are that 2  0 , 3  0 , and that the
coefficients attached to Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec, Budget and Industrial are negative.
Results: OLS.–– The basic results obtained using the OLS within estimator with
robust standard errors are given in Table 4. Columns 1-3 refer to each of the three
categories of provision for the whole sample, and columns 4-6 list the estimates
for the Oil crisis period (1970-1983). The key observation is that the coefficients

31

Similarly, the impact of Rev_Door and Jud_Term (which lack within variation) on prices can

only be assessed by looking at their effect on the pass-through of cost shocks. When I perform this
exercise, Rev_Door (Jud_Term) tend to increase (decrease) the pass-through. Instead, if I consider
a dummy equal to one if both commissioners and judges are elected and zero otherwise, it shows
the expected negative sign but is not significant. The other results are always qualitatively similar.
32

Clearly, the effects of cost shocks may materialize with lags. Lagging the cost index of one or

two years does not significantly affect the findings reported below.
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on costs interacted with whether a state elects its regulators or judges are always
negative. While 3 is always significant at 20 percent or better, 2 is significant in
columns 4-6, but only for commercial ratepayers in columns 1-3. These results
suggest that regulators’ pandering incentives are more powerful, both in an
absolute sense and with respect to judges, in periods of rising input prices.
This is clearer when the implied effects are evaluated. Focusing on residential
rates, the pass-through coefficient for states electing judges rises from roughly
one half of the coefficient for appointing states in column 1 to three-fourths in
column 4; and the pass-through coefficient for states electing regulators falls from
roughly nine-tenth the coefficient for appointing states in column 1 to two-thirds
in column 4 (which is coherent with evidence in Besley and Coate, 2003).
A reform toward election also has the general effect of rebalancing rates in favour
of residential ratepayers at the expenses of business customers. The effect is
stronger in the judicial case and amounts to a net saving of 4 (7) percentage-price
points in column 1 (2). Finally, the evidence on Budget and Industrial is mixed:
while the main predictions are met in columns 1-3, opposite patterns arise in
columns 4-6. Other controls (not shown) are also often significant but the implied
impact varies in a non systematic way across the columns.
The evidence highlights the relevance of both judicial review and the quality of
information-gathering in explaining prices. Yet, as seen above, regulatory regimes
are selected nonrandomly, and a relevant determinant of regulatory policies is the
persistence in pricing choices. Next, I put together these instances and switch to
the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator.
Results: GMM difference estimator.–– I use the more efficient two-step procedure
and always apply the Windmeijer finite-sample correction to the robust standard
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errors in order to avoid downward bias (see Roodman, 2006). I treat the lagged
price as being predetermined and the fossil fuels cost index (whether or not it is
interacted with selection rules) as being endogenous. Here, a crucial challenge is
to avoid too many instruments. The instruments count tends to explode with the
number of years T , and too many moment conditions can overfit endogenous
variables, failing to expunge their endogenous component. Besides, they can also
weaken the power of the Hansen test for overidentification restrictions (which is
the consistent one when the standard errors are robust) (see Roodman, 2006).
Coherently, I gather into the instrument matrix all pricing equation controls X i ,t ,
those determinants of selection rule zit that can be excluded by the pricing process
and one (two) lags of the predetermined and endogenous variables when the full
sample (the Oil crisis period) is considered in columns 1-3 (4-6). Each moment
condition is collapsed into a single column.33
The excluded zit are: Ereg_Nei, Ejud_Nei, Aud_Elec and 20th_Jref. A crystalclear argument for the exogeneity of the first two is provided by Steiner (2004):
while the presence of low prices in reforming neighbouring states could shift
support for reform in state i , electricity rates do not adjust until the reform is
implemented in state i . For what concerns Aud_Elec and 20th_Jref, there is little
reason to expect that a general taste for election or technological innovations in
judicial incentive rules design to have––conditional on the proxies for political
competition and efficiency of the information-gathering technology––a systematic
33

This strategy reduces the instrument count well below the number of cross sections: this insures

against a “too many instruments” failure (see Roodman, 2006). The results remain robust when I
switch to the one-step estimator or to the system GMM, when I instrument with one more lag of
the endogenous and predetermined variables, or consider subgroups of the excluded instruments.
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effect on the pricing process. Less clear is a defence of the proxies for the quality
of institutions and the saliency of regulation (see Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
Table 5 reports the basic results. The Arellano and Bond (1991) autocovariance
test does not reject a zero second-order correlation in the differenced residuals at a
level lower than 0.14, and the Hansen test does not reject the overidentifying
restrictions at a level lower than 0.17. This reassures about consistency.
While lagged prices are, over the whole period, the most important covariate, the
cost index gains a chief role in the inflationary years (columns 4-6). Coherently,
the role of commissioners becomes key when regulation also becomes more
salient (because of unexpected cost shocks), and a greater visibility is attached to
regulatory office-holding with respect to that of other public officials (like
judges). The impact of judicial election, instead, is stable and huge, implying a
zero price responsiveness to cost shocks in columns 1-2. Judicial (regulatory)
election also leads to significant falls in pass-through in columns 4 (6 and 4 at 40
percent): this confirms, once again, the practice of allowing cross-subsides to
residential and commercial users at the expenses of business customers.34

6. Concluding Remarks
Regulatory institutions are fundamental to economic development, especially in a
period of deregulation and competition enhancing reforms. Yet the determinants
34

A very similar picture arises when I consider the time-varying controls enumerated in footnote

23 or binaries for several public benefit programs and performance-based regulation. The evidence
also remains qualitatively the same when I run separate cross-sectional regressions. For the year
1996, more detailed measures of average cost are available. In the latter case, estimates of the
average treatment effect by the Heckman correction or the propensity score confirm the evidence.
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of the institutional design of regulated markets are essentially poorly understood:
here, I developed and tested a model of endogenous regulatory appointment rules.
Given both the intrinsic motivations of public officials and the technological
environment, political reformers not only consider the comparative advantages of
different appointment rules but also use them to tie the hands of rival parties.
Consistent with the model, data from the US electric power market suggest that
the likelihood of reforms toward regulatory election increases with less abundant
resources, cheaper electricity generation and harsher political competition. Also,
electricity rates are lower and respond less to shocks in input costs in states
electing their top-level regulators or their High Court judges.
My analysis delivers two pieces of advice for constitutional designers. First, in
reforming the design of regulatory regimes, it is crucial to assess the consequence
of appointment rules on the firms’ investment incentives in the light of the
efficiency of the information-gathering technology and the broad set of concerns
to which supervisors respond. Second, the success of regulatory regime reforms is
linked to a Constitutional table fully insulated from short-term electoral boosts.
Despite recent waves of deregulation, most US monopolies are still regulated
through the settings studied above. Similar institutional designs have recently
been exported beyond American boundaries as an answer to the rising demand for
a more effective judicial review and a greater transparency of the regulatory
process. This institutional trend makes the US lesson an absolutely relevant case
study that is especially useful for the harmonization of European markets.35
35

The UK is a case in point. The Utilities Act of 2000 entrusted the regulation of electricity and

gas to officials (GEMA) appointed by the Secretary of State and supported by an independent staff
(Ofgem), which proposes the policy position and is subject to judicial review (OECD, 2002).
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6. Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium under Perfect Information
Under perfect information, the planner knows  . Maximizing  2  with respect to U and
q , we obtain the following:

1. The social marginal value of output and its marginal cost are equalized:
V   q*   1    S   q*   1   

S   q*   p*  c ;

or

2. Given the existence of the shadow cost of rewards, no rent is left to the firm:
U 0

t *   q* .

or

■

6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let me start from the equilibrium efforts prevailing when supervisors are elected. To this
extent, maximizing RE ,l  eE ,l , S  with respect to eE ,l with eEexp,l taken as given and, then,
imposing the equilibrium condition eˆE ,l  eEexp,l , equilibrium efforts are defined by
LHS  eˆE ,l   1  SR  f    eˆE ,l  1  1  S  J  1  K  C   eˆE ,l   0 ,

 A2 
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and by the slackness  eˆE ,l  1 LHS  eˆE ,l   0 and eˆE ,l LHS  eˆE ,l   0 . In the eˆE ,l , RE ,l  eE ,l , S 
space, the first term in LHS  eˆE ,l  is a rectangular hyperbola centred at  0, 0  while the
second term is an increasing function. This, along with the fact that C   0    and that
limei ,l 1 C   ei ,l    , ensures that eˆE ,l exists and it is both interior and unique. Turning to

appointed supervisors and following the treatment in Dewatripont et al. (1999),
equilibrium efforts are implicitly defined by the following first order condition

1  SR  E  fe  A,l







eˆA,l  f  A,l eˆA,l   1  1  S  J  1  K  C   eˆA,l  .


A ,l

 A3

Again  A3 holds as an equality (and thus the slackness conditions are always met).
The marginal density of the observable conditional on effort f  A,l eˆA,l  is proportional to
exp    A,l   eA,l 


2



2 eAexp,l  

 

if f is truncated normal and equal to eˆA,l f   if f is

2

one of the other distributions in the relevant class. From the equilibrium condition









eA,l  eAexp,l , it follows that E  feA,l  A,l eˆA,l  f  A,l eˆA,l    eˆA,l and  A3 rewrites as



1  SR 

 A4 

eˆA,l  1  1  S  J  1  K  C   eˆA,l  .

Thus,  A2  and  A4  clarify that: 1. elected supervisors exert strictly greater effort than
appointed ones if f    1 (which is always true under A1); 2. Supervisors’ objective
functions are strictly concave and the following three global comparative statics apply:
eˆi , R R  0, i ; eˆ j , J J  0, j ; eˆi , R K  0, i , eˆ j , J K  0, j .

■

6.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Let me first calculate the conditions under which   eˆi , R  eˆi , R  0 :
 1    i, j   qˆ S , I eˆi , R     i, j  eˆi , R  qˆ S , I  1    i, j   qˆ S , I eˆi , R  0 

 1   eˆ j , J 
  i, j 
qˆ S , I 1
1
 .



S ,I
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ei , R q
ei , R 1    i, j  1   eˆi , R  1   eˆ j , J  1   eˆi , R

 A5
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Applying the implicit function theorem to  6  , the following holds true:

 

 

qˆ S , I eˆi , R     v   1   eˆ j , J   V  qˆ S , I    1      v  1   eˆ j , J   S  qˆ S , I .

Plugging qˆ S , I eˆi , R and  6  in  A5 , I obtain that:


 
 

S  qˆ S , I qˆ S , I
   v   1   eˆ j , J  

   v  1   eˆi , R  1   eˆ j , J  




S
,
I
S
,
I
S
,
I
1 
1   eˆi , R
1 
S  qˆ
qˆ
S  qˆ
S  qˆ S , I

 

 
S   qˆ 

S  qˆ S , I qˆ S , I
S ,I



 
S   qˆ 

S  qˆ S , I qˆ S , I
S ,I

 

 1      v  1    i, j   .
  p ,q   
   1      v  1    i, j  

So, provided that  p,q  1 ,  strictly increases with eˆi , R .
Regulatory appointment rules, R and K affect  only through eˆi , R . As a result, under
A1,   eˆE , R     eˆA, R  . Also, from  A2  and  A4  , it follows that
eˆE , R
R

eˆE , R
R





eˆ
f    1  K 
 1  K 

 A, R ,
R
ei , RC   ei , R   C   ei , R 
ei , RC   ei , R   C   ei , R 

1  R  f    1  K 

2

ei , RC   ei , R   C   ei , R 



1  R  1  K 

2

ei , R C   ei , R   C   ei , R 



eˆA, R .
R

Therefore, the following inequalities conclude the proof:
  eˆE , R    eˆA, R   eˆE , R  eˆA, R   eˆE , R eˆA, R 
,






0
R
R
eˆi , R R eˆi , R R
eˆi , R  R
R 
  eˆE , R    eˆA, R   eˆE , R  eˆA, R   eˆE , R eˆA, R 
.






0
K
K
eˆi , R K eˆi , R K
eˆi , R  K
K 

■

6.4 Proof of Proposition 2
First, notice that the value of  D and  R are respectively
D    xD  R xR    D , R    xD  R xR   1    R  1 xR .

Under A2, they are both negative. Turning to  and  , being   0 , it is clear that,
from  7  ,  (  ) is the minimum (maximum) value such that the first (second) of the
following inequalities hold:
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Wˆ S  eˆ   Wˆ S  eˆ       v max  ,     eˆ     eˆ  , R, K ;
E,R
A, R 
D
R 
A, R
E,R 


Wˆ S  eˆ   Wˆ S  eˆ       v min  ,     eˆ     eˆ  , R, K .
E,R
A, R 
D
R 
A, R
E ,R 



By the same token, the values of  for which the impact of a change in R and K has a
greater effect on the dynamic efficiency part of the reformer’s utility than on the static
efficiency bit are the maximum values of  such that, respectively:
Wˆ S  eˆE , R   eˆE , R eˆA, R 
  eˆE , R eˆA, R  , R, K ;

     v min  D ,  R 





eˆi , R  R
R 
eˆi , R  R
R 

Wˆ S  eˆE , R   eˆE , R eˆA, R 
  eˆE , R eˆA, R  , R, K .

     v min  D ,  R 





eˆi , R  K
K 
eˆi , R  K
K 

 

Clearly enough,  R   K   . Also,    whenever        or
 max  D ,  R     eˆE , R     eˆA, R    min  D ,  R 

 eˆi , R
Wˆ S  eˆ   Wˆ S  eˆ  R, K ,
E ,R
A, R 

ˆ
S


W  eˆE , R  eˆi , R 

which is always the case under the second inequality in point 2 of A2. The latter also
implies that  D and  R are different and, therefore,      . Thus, for     
either appointment or election can be selected and the comparative statics with respect to

 , R and K hold by inspection of  7  and by Lemma 2 (which, indeed, ensures that
  eˆE , R  R    eˆA, R  R  0 and   eˆE , R  K    eˆA, R  K  0 ). Also, because  D and

 R are not comparable under the parameter restrictions in A2, the statement about the

reformer’s identity is true. Finally, a rise in xm makes more difficult that election is
preferred because both D xD and R xR are negative under A2. Indeed,

D xD   1  R   0 , R xR    R  1  1    R  1   R  1  1     0 .

■

6.5 Data
The data set gathers observations for 49 states over the period 1970–1997. Only a few
data points are available for the District of Columbia, and no IOUs serve Nebraska.

44
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

45

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 214 [2008]

1. Data on regulatory selection rules, revolving-door restrictions on commissioners,
bipartisanship requirements, total budget and the year the public utility commission was
founded and whether it was constitutionally formed are collected from:
A. PUCs’ web pages; B. NARUC, 1970–1997. Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies.
NARUC, Washington DC; C. Beecher, J. A., 2007. Historical Names and Dates of the
Public Service Commissions. Mimeo: Michigan State University.
2. Data on judicial selection rules, office terms and the year the state joined the Union are
collected from: A. Hanssen (2004b), Table 1; B. Besley and Payne (2005), Table 1.
3. Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks:
CSG, 1970–1997. The Book of the States. CSG, Lexington, KY.
4. Data on sales, revenue, generation shares and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per
net Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook:
A. EEI, 1995. 1960–1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry; B. EEI,
1993–1997. Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry. Washington, DC: EEI.
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA,
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Residential, commercial and industrial users
account for 95 percent of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of energy
for generation in two types of breakdown–that is, by type of prime mover driving the
generator and by energy source. The totals from both of these are consistent. I used the
second one, except for generation by hydro (see also Besley and Coate, 2003). Prices are
calculated from revenues and sales in terms of cents per Kwh.
5. Let sijt and qijt be the share and price of input j (coal, gas, oil) used in state i and year t .
So, if pi ,t   qijt pijt qit is the average (composite) price of fossil fuels per net Kwh for
j
state i in year t , then the cost index is defined as ci ,t  sit pit .
6. Data on state auditor selection rules come from: Schelker, M., 2007. Public Auditors:
Empirical Evidence from the US States. Mimeo, University of Fribourg.
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7. State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5–17
are calculated from a US Census Bureau (UCB) publication:
UCB, 1970-1997. Population Estimates Program. Washington DC: UCB.

6.6 Tables

Table 1: History of Appointment Rules, 1970–1997.
Judicial selection rules
AL[Pe], AR[Pe], GA[Pe/Ne(1984–)], ID[Ne], IL[Pe], KY[Ne], LA[Pe/Ne(1976–)], MI[Ne],
Jud_Elec [21]:
MN[Ne], MS[Pe/Ne(1994–)], MT[Ne], NV[Ne], NC[Pe], ND[Ne], OH[Ne], OR[Ne], PA[Pe],
TX[Pe], WA[Ne], WV[Pe], WI[Ne]
AK[Mp], CA[Ga], CO[Mp], CT[Ga], DE[Ga], HI[Mp], IN[Mp], IA[Mp], KS[Mp], ME[Ga],
Jud_App [20]:
MA[Ga], MO[Mp], NH[Ga], NJ[Ga], OK[Mp], RI[La/ Ga(1994–)], SC[La], UT[Mp],
VT[La/Ga(1984–)], VA[La]
AZ[Ne/Mp(1974–)], FL[Pe/Mp(1972–)], MD[Ne/Mp(1976–)],NM[Pe/Mp(1989–)],
Switching [8]:
NY[Pe/Ga(1978–)], SD[Ne/Mp(1981–)], TN[Pe/Mp(1994–)], WY[Ne/Mp(1973–)]
Regulatory selection rules
Reg_Elec [9]:
AL [E], AZ [E], GA[E], LA[E], MS[E], MT[E], ND[E], OK[E], SD[E]
AK[Gal], AR[Ga], CA[Gas], CO[Gas], CT[Gal], DE[Gas], HI[Gas], ID[Gas], IL[Gas],
Reg_App [35]:
IN[Ga], IA[Ga], KS[Gas], KY[Ga], ME[Gas], MD[Gas], MA[Ga], MI[Gas], MO[Ga],
NV[Ga], NH[Gae], NJ[Gas], NM[Ga], NY[Gas], NC[GA], OH[Gas], OR[Ga], PA[Gas],
RI[Gas], UT[Gas], VT[Ga], VA[Le], WA[Gas], WV[Gas], WI[Gas], WY[Gas]
FL[E/Gas(1981–)], MN[E(1960–1971)/Ga(1972–1975)/ E(1976–1977)/Ga(1978–)],
Switching [5]:
SC[Le/E(1996–)], TN[E/GAa(1996–)], TX[E/Ga(1977–)]
Notes: 1. In the judicial rules panel, the acronimous Pe, Ne, Ga, La and Mp stand for partisan election,
nonpartisan election, appointment by Governor, appointment by Legislature, and merit plan.
2. In the regulatory selection rule panel, the acronimous E, Ga, Gas, Gae, Gal, GAa, Le stand for direct
election, appointment by Governor, appointment by Governor with confirmation by the Senate,
appointment by Governor with confirmation by executive council, appointment by Governor with
approval by legislature, selection by general assembly and selection by Legislature.
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Table 2: Variables Names and Descriptions.
Variables
Reg_Elec:

Supervisors’
implicit
incentives

Reg_Ord:
Jud_Elec:
Jud_Ord:

Supervisors’
intrinsic
motivations

Supervision
technology

Prices

Rev_Door:
Bipartisan:

Description
Dummy variable taking value 1 if public utility commissioners are elected; 0
otherwise.
Dummy variable taking value 3 if commissioners are elected by voters; 1 if
they are appointed with the approval by both houses; 2 otherwise.
Dummy variable taking value 1 if High Court judges are elected; 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable taking value 3 if High Court judges are selected through
partisan election; 1 if the merit plan is in use; 2 otherwise.
Dummy variable taking value 1 if there is a time restriction on commissioners
working for the regulated industry once they have left the PUC; 0 otherwise.
Dummy variable taking value 1 appointed commissioners cannot all be from
the same party; 0 otherwise.

Jud_Term:

Length of High Court judges’ term in years.

Budget:

PUC’s total receipts in thousands of dollars.

Industrial:

Percentage of total revenue from sales to customers that are industrial.

Price_R:

Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to residential users.

Price_C:

Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to commercial users.

Price_I:

Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to industrial users.

Average costs c:

Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh) – see Appendix 6.5.

Society
investment
concerns

Gen_Hydro:

Percentage of total generation from hydroelectric sources.

Political
competition

Majority:

Other
determinants
of
appointment
rules

Oil_Ref:

Rep:
Ereg_Nei:

Share of neighbouring states electing public utility commissioners.

Ejud_Nei:

Share of neighbouring states electing their High Court judges.

PUC_Fou:

Year the PUC was founded.

Join:

Year the state joined the Union.

Aud_Elec:

Dummy variable taking value 1 if state auditors are elected; 0 otherwise.

PUC_Con:
20th_Jref:

Other
Controls

Dummy variable taking value 1 if the state changed the commissioners’
appointment rule during the period 1973–1982; 0 otherwise.
Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by the
majority party.
Dummy variable taking value 1 if both houses are controlled (with the
absolute majority of seats) by the Republican party; 0 otherwise.

Dummy variable taking value 1 if the PUC was constitutionally formed; 0
otherwise.
Dummy variable taking value 1 if Jud_Elec has changed during the twentieth
century; 0 otherwise.

Gen_Nucl:

Percentage of total generation from nuclear sources.

Pop:

State population.

Old:

Percentage of population aged 65 and over.

Young:

Percentage of population aged 5–17.

GSP:

Gross state product per capita, in dollars.

Mean
[standard
deviation]
0.220
[0.414]
2.118
[0.555]
0.485
[0.500]
1.937
[0.697]
0.653
[0.476]
0.224
[0.417]
8.592
[3.058]
12057.37
[26991.38]
0.288
[0.097]
5.918
[2.680]
5.528
[2.435]
3.810
[1.925]
1.096
[0.899]
0.198
[0.317]
0.061
[0.240]
0.669
[0.129]
0.351
[0.477]
0.234
[0.271]
0.516
[0.319]
1891.531
[23.011]
1839.245
[47.598]
0.327
[0.470]
0.163
[0.370]
0.306
[0.461]
0.144
[0.194]
4,744,061
[5,050,415]
0.110
[0.031]
0.204
[0.049]
12148.88
[7306.264]
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Table 3: Determinants of Appointment Rules.
(1)
Rev_Door
Bipartisan

Reg_Ord = 3
0.013
[0.023]
– 0.182
[0.017]***

Reg_Ord = 1
– 0.001
[0.002]
0.020
[0.005]***

(2)
Reg_Ord
– 0.121
[0.190]
– 1.166
[0.149]***

Jud_Term
Budget
Industrial
Gen_Hydro
Oil_Ref
Majority
Rep
Ereg_Nei

– 2.86e-06
[0.00000]***
0.335
[0.083]***
0.036
[0.027]†
– 0.077
[0.012]***
0.082
[0.066]
– 0.015
[0.015]
0.415
[0.060]***

– 7.38e-08
[0.00000]†
– 0.080
[0.012]***
– 0.005
[0.004]†
– 0.058
[0.009]***
0.021
[0.008]***
0.0003
[0.0015]
0.029
[0.005]***

– 4.14e-06
[1.55e-06]***
3.880
[0.643]***
0.768
[0.195]***
– 0.361
[0.301]
– 0.381
[0.563]
– 0.132
[0.125]
2.627
[0.372]***

Join
Aud_Elec
PUC_Con

– 0.019
[0.018]
5.41e-06
[1.97e-06]***
1.667
[0.560]***
0.839
[0.202]***

2.518
[0.462]***
0.093
[0.120]

0.910
[0.156]***

Ejud_Nei
PUC_Fou

(3)
Jud_Ord

0.00005
[0.0003]
0.0003
[0.0002]*
– 0.080
[0.014]***
0.190
[0.064]***

0.0004
[0.00006]***
– 0.0001
[0.00003]***
– 0.0063
[0.0015]***
0.0002
[0.002]

– 0.020
[0.002]***
0.006
[0.002]***
0.081
[0.138]
0.630
[0.258]**

20th_Jref
– 0.130
0.035
– 3.060
[0.057]**
[0.006]***
[0.375]***
Estimation
Multinomial Logit
Ordered Logit
Number of Observations
1372
1372
Pseudo R2
0.37
0.18
PseudoLogLikelihood
– 712.590
– 929.294
Notes: 1. The entries of the columns in panel (1) are estimated marginal effects;
2. Robust standard errors (z distribution) in parentheses;
3. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; †, 20%.
Gen_Nucl

– 0.018
[0.002]***
0.008
[0.132]
– 2.393
[0.200]***
– 0.267
[0.284]
Ordered Logit
1372
0.25
– 1061.656
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Table 4: Pass-Through of Cost Shocks, Fixed Effects (Within) Estimator.

Reg_Elec
Jud_Elec
c
Reg_Elec*c
Jud_Elec*c
Budget
Industrial

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Price_R
Price_C
Price_I
Price_R
Price_C
Price_I
0.312
0.114
0.310
0.197
– 0.210
– 0.025
[0.195]*
[0.162]
[0.185]*
[0.112]*
[0.203]
[0.157]
0.178
0.120
– 0.235
– 0.362
– 0.140
– 0.347
[0.130]†
[0.088]†
[0.175]†
[0.179]**
[0.144]
[0.164]**
0.502
0.531
0.476
0.857
0.846
0.860
[0.075]***
[0.073]***
[0.079]***
[0.069]***
[0.074]***
[0.058]***
– 0.028
– 0.175
– 0.038
– 0.279
– 0.219
– 0.180
[0.083]
[0.081]**
[0.060]
[0.068]***
[0.076]***
[0.058]***
– 0.238
– 0.189
– 0.160
– 0.195
– 0.100
– 0.168
[0.081]***
[0.077]**
[0.058]***
[0.075]***
[0.078]†
[0.059]***
-06
0.00001
0.00001
– 1.55e-06
– 1.35e-06
– 2.88e-06
3.79e
-06
-06
-07
-07
-07
-06
[5.85e ]*
[4.01e ]***
[8.27e ]*
[8.34e ]*
[7.28e ]***
[6.51e ]
0.548
0.324
0.556
2.480
2.755
– 2.523
[0.681]
[0.496]
[0.667]
[0.679]***
[0.591]***
[0.629]***
Majority, Rep, Gen_Hydro, Gen_Nucl, Pop, Pop2, Old, Young, GSP, GSP2, time dummies.
Fixed time and state effects (within) estimator.

Other Controls
Estimation
Number of
1372
1372
1372
686
Observations
2
R (within)
0.91
0.90
0.89
0.95
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; †, 20%.

686

686

0.93

0.95

Table 5: Pass-Through of Cost Shocks, Difference GMM Estimator.

Lagged Dependent
c
Reg_Elec*c
Jud_Elec*c
Budget
Industrial
Other Controls
Estimation
Predetermined
Endogenous

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Price_R
Price_C
Price_I
Price_R
Price_C
Price_I
0.898
0.672
0.952
0.221
0.198
– 0.092
[0.141]***
[0.185]***
[0.283]***
[0.182]^
[0.265]
[0.270]
0.300
0.530
0.143
1.240
1.473
1.071
[0.290]^
[0.444]^
[0.812]
[0.204]***
[0.563]***
[0.273]***
0.133
0.038
0.110
– 0.354
– 0.343
– 0.346
[0.187]
[0.256]
[0.376]
[0.407]
[0.397]
[0.318]^
– 0.334
– 0.513
– 0.168
– 0.300
– 0.285
– 0.017
[0.185]*
[0.260]**
[0.185]
[0.290]^
[0.434]
[0.316]
6.11e-07
5.49e-07
0.00001
4.81e-07
3.02e-06
– 9.71e-07
-06
-06
-06
-06
-06
[2.34e ]
[1.72e ]
[6.03e ]*
[9.76e ]
[8.75e-06]
[2.26e ]
1.701
2.560
4.665
0.936
1.539
2.836
[1.187]†
[1.542]*
[2.748]*
[1.118]
[1.377]^
[2.418]^
Majority, Rep, Gen_Hydro, Gen_Nucl, Pop, Old, Young, GSP, time dummies.
Fixed time and state effects twostep difference GMM.
Lagged dependent variable.
One lag of predetermined and endogenous, c,
Two lags of predetermined and endogenous, c,
Reg_Elec*c, Jud_Elec*c.
Reg_Elec*c, Jud_Elec*c.
Ereg_Nei, Ejud_Nei, Aud_Elec, 20th_Jref.
44
44
44
34
34
34
0.21
0.83
0.14
0.14
0.79
0.39

Instruments (collapsed)
Instruments count
Autocov. of order 2
Hansen Test for
0.55
0.17
0.31
0.67
Overid. Restrict.
Number of Observations
1274
1274
1274
588
Notes: 1. Windmeijer corrected robust standard errors in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; †, 20%; ^, 30%.

0.32

0.66

588

588
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